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Abstract

The Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute was passed by Congress as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, partly as a reaction to a
nationwide debate about excessive use of police force after Rodney King’s brutal killing
in 1991. The statute gave the Department of Justice the ability to investigate and file suits
against individual police departments; the statute’s intent was both to reform the
investigated departments with high amounts of misconduct and excessive force and to
incentivize police reform nationwide. However, because of the financial setbacks
involved in launching investigations and inconsistency in implementation, this statute is
generally regarded by scholars as inefficient. This study examines how the statute has
been used in recent years, specifically studying six case reports provided by the
Department of Justice. By examining these reports, the study aims to identify certain
systemic failures that lead to high amounts of misconduct reports and excessive force
complaints as well as common reforms, which can be implemented in departments to
potentially combat excessive force proactively. Furthermore, this study includes
interviews with two Mississippi police departments, the Hattiesburg and Laurel
departments, to further analyze what is currently being done at the local level to deal with
potential misconduct and excessive force complaints.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
With recent events in the news, such as the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric
Gardner, and Tamir Rice, police brutality and accountability has become an issue that has
garnered the attention of the media, the government, and American citizens. The deaths
of these three unarmed black men, all occurring in 2014, have sparked debates
throughout the nation. These deaths were highly publicized by the media, sparking
debates about police monitoring and reform. In Ferguson, Missouri, an 18-year-old
unarmed black man was shot during an altercation Ferguson Police Department Officer
Darren Wilson. Though he was put on trial, Officer Wilson was not indicted by the grand
jury on criminal charges, a decision which sparked protests and riots throughout the city
(Buchanan et. al., 2015). The death of another unarmed black man, Eric Gardner, sparked
similar protests in New York. Gardner was killed when a New York police officer used a
chokehold against him, despite the fact that the chokehold is banned by the department’s
regulations. Officer Daniel Pantaleo was not indicted for criminal charges either. The
words Gardner spoke before his death, “I can’t breathe,” became famous and were shown
on t-shirts and signs of protestors of police brutality throughout the city (Siff, Dienst, &
Millman, 2014). Within the same year, a 12-year-old boy was shot in Cleveland, Ohio, by
an officer who confused his toy gun for a real weapon. The Ohio grand jury chose not to
indict Officers Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback, just as the grand juries in
Missouri and New York did (Fantz, Almasy, & Shoichet, 2015). Reading about these
cases in 2014 drew me to this research and drove me to learn more about how
departments can be enticed to implement reform that might prevent these types of deaths.
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Debates over the frequency of police brutality occurrence, police transparency
and accountability, and police reform are not new, but they have been brought back to
national attention in light of these recent killings. This same line of debate spurred the
creation of the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a statute
included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. This law and
this statute was designed to decrease police misconduct and excessive force nationwide.
The statute prohibits law enforcement agencies from engaging in “a pattern or practice of
conduct” that violates a person’s civil rights; it also gives the Assistant Attorney General
of Civil Rights the authority to oversee an investigation of a police department and
eliminate this pattern or practice (42 U.S.C. § 14141, 1994). In practice, the Special
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has been able
to investigate police departments that demonstrate suspicious patterns and practices,
sometimes entering into consent decrees or settlement agreements that put certain
reforms in place in these departments, typically monitored by an agreed upon third party.
Recently, police departments featured in the news, such as those in Ferguson, Missouri,
and Cleveland, Ohio, have been investigated by the Department of Justice through the
use of this statute.
When Congress passed this legislation in 1994, many scholars attempted to
predict what effects it would have on police misconduct and brutality (Gilles, 2000;
Livingston, 1999; Miller, 1998). More than a decade later, scholars are still debating the
effectiveness of § 14141 in combating police brutality and misconduct (Clark, 2011;
Harmon, 2009; Rushin 2014; Simmons 2011), and some scholars have conducted
research indicating that changes should be made to this legislation in order to make it
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more effective (e.g. Gilles, 2000; Harmon, 2009). A common concern among these
scholars is the statute’s tendency to act as a punishment for a limited number of police
departments rather than serving as an incentive for all police departments throughout the
nation to practice fair, ethical policing. With limited funding and resources, the Justice
Department is only capable of bringing cases forth against a limited number of
departments, and since there is no consistent or required data collection of the use of
police force department nationwide, the Justice Department is left to determine which
department to investigate based on specific complaints rather than comprehensive
statistics (Harmon, 2009).

Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
In this proposed research, I want to add to the conversation about the
effectiveness of § 14141 by examining a number of cases brought forth under the statute
thus far and analyzing the reforms that have resulted from each case. In this analysis, I
have identified certain behaviors and recurring problems that lead to a high amount of
misconduct within a specific police department and certain common reforms that are
enacted as a result of this statute. Finally, by comparing the potential reforms with a few
current local systems, I plan to identify potential areas that could be improved upon
within our local systems to decrease the likelihood of misconduct. The purpose of this
study, as a whole, is to address the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. §
14141 as a working tool to identify certain problem areas in departments with high
amounts of misconduct and excessive force complaints and implement reforms to
improve these problem areas. I will assess the ability of § 14141 to properly incentivize
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reform nationwide, which was part of its originally intended goal. Thus the research is led
by the question: how does the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute measure as a tool to
reduce the amount of misconduct and excessive force within police department?

Methodology
In order to examine the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, I have researched a
number of the investigations that the Department of Justice has conducted thus far. The
scope of my study includes the investigations of the Cleveland Division of Police, the
Ferguson Department of Justice, the New Orleans Police Department, the Puerto Rico
Police Department, the Seattle Police Department, and the Portland Police Department.
These cases stood out to me because they had commonalities in their findings of
excessive force; furthermore, they had information readily available online on the
Department of Justice’s website. While they are not the only six investigations that
yielded findings of excessive force, their information was both diverse and similar in a
way that allowed me to draw arching conclusions while keeping in mind the
individualized needs of specific departments. I have also selected these six investigations
because they were conducted within the past 5 years, allowing my analysis to remain as
current as possible. Each of these specific investigations originated from complaints
about the departments’ use of excessive force and police misconduct, and the Department
of Justice has provided records of these six investigations online. Thus because of limits
on time and resources, I will utilize these online materials to draw my conclusions.
The study begins with a thorough literature review in Chapter 2 to reveal how the
statute has been used thus far and whether scholars feel it has the ability to accomplish its
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intended goal. I have researched the nature of the investigations that take place under this
statute and the frequency of these investigations. In Chapter 3, I have assessed the six
investigations included in the study and provided an analysis of certain behaviors or
practices that may lead to the investigation of a department and a high amount of
misconduct within a department. In each case, I examined the Findings Reports issued by
the Department of Justice, which describe the results of their in-depth investigation. Next,
in Chapter 4, I have analyzed the police department reforms that are most commonly
presented as a result of the investigation, noting the most common reforms that the
Justice Department tends to put in place in the departments they investigate. I examined
each consent decree or settlement agreement entered into by each of the six departments,
which describe the Justice Department’s requirements for implementing reforms. In
Chapter 5, this information is compared to the systems in place at two local Mississippi
police departments. By examining the common reforms set in place by § 14141 consent
decrees and settlement agreements, I have assessed potential ways that local departments
could improve their current systems to prevent misconduct and excessive force.
In order to advance my knowledge on the subject and incorporate the opinions of
officials who deal with this topic firsthand, I have conducted interviews with officers
from two local departments: the Hattiesburg Police Department and the Laurel Police
Department, both in southern Mississippi. Although I had hoped to have an interview
with the New Orleans Police Department, one of the departments discussed in the study,
they did not agree to an interview. In these interviews, I have gathered more information
about local police departments in order to assess police accountability and transparency
efforts within these departments and to identify current practices in local areas. During
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these interviews, I also asked follow up questions when necessary, gleaning as much
information as possible about the current operation of our local police department to
provide context for my research. I have recorded these interviews and taken notes that
guided me as I listened and transcribed the interview. The survey instrument inserted
below asks five main questions, but these interviews were conducted in a conversational
manner with follow-up questions asked throughout.

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
A Need for the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute
The Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. § 14141 was enacted as a
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, otherwise known
as the Crime Act (Clark, 2011). Though there was some back and forth between the
House of Representatives and the Senate, the bill was eventually passed with the support
of most Democrats in Congress at the time and signed into law by Bill Clinton (Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Before this statute passed, the
Department of Justice did not play any significant role in monitoring police activity to
ensure that they were not violating the civil rights of citizens protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution in their practices (Livingston, 1999). In a broader
context, the statute responded to a need for the creation of a body that could advocate for
the protection of individuals’ civil rights, since the job of the police department is not
necessarily to protect civil rights but to prevent crime (Harmon, 2009). In fact, police
departments often are hesitant to enact reforms that could protect civil rights because
these reforms may prevent officers from using every possible method to stop crime and
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may take time and energy away from their efforts to prevent and solve crime (Harmon,
2009).
Because of this resistance, police departments need other incentives and
assistance in order to create meaningful reform and take necessary steps towards reducing
police misconduct (Harmon, 2009). Local political pressure and previous federal efforts
to prevent police misconduct before § 14141 did not spur reform in an effective,
systematic way because they were too weak or too narrow (Harmon, 2009). For example,
before § 14141, citizens used 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a law which allowed them to bring civil
suits against the police for alleged violations of their constitutional rights (Ross and
Parke, 2009). However, the results of this method have proven to be only moderately
successful since these cases are hard to win, and though some departmental reform may
be enacted as a result of these suits, they are limited and ineffective in preventing
misconduct (Ross and Parke, 2009; Harmon, 2009). The exclusionary rule, another
method of reducing police misconduct, enforces the protection of a person’s Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights and excludes the use of evidence gathered in violation
of these rights from being used in trial (Ross and Parke, 2009). Again, this method of
reducing police misconduct is limited and narrow in scope (Harmon, 2009).
In part, this particular statute was created in response to specific acts of police
brutality that had become major news throughout the nation, such as the beating of
Rodney King in 1991 (Livingston, 1999; Ross and Parke, 2009). The videotaped beating
of Rodney King brought the issue of police misconduct and brutality to the public’s
attention, and Congress responded by “creating a new legal mechanism to permit
structural litigation reform against police departments” (Harmon, 2009, p. 13).
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Ultimately, the goal of § 14141 was to overcome the limitations of previous federal
methods of reducing misconduct, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the exclusionary rule, and
to create an incentive for local police departments to implement proactive structural
reforms (Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2014). By giving the Department of Justice the ability
to launch an investigation into specific police departments that may show a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional behaviors, § 14141 allows proactive reform in departments
with records of misconduct (Miller, 1998).
What the Statute Does
The Law Enforcement Statute 42 U.S.C. § 14141 expressly gives the Special
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice the authority
to actively investigate local police departments suspected of unconstitutional patterns and
practices that deprive individuals of their civil rights. This statute’s purpose has been to
enact organizational reform in police departments that have engaged in unconstitutional
patterns and practices, often by increasing police accountability (Walker, 2012). These
reforms are enacted in a consent decree, a settlement agreement, or a technical assistance
letter recommending reform (Harmon, 2009). These reforms are then monitored by a
third party, if they are enacted by a consent decree or a settlement agreement.
The first step in this investigation process is identifying a specific department
engaging in unconstitutional patterns or practices, or what one scholar refers to as the
“case selection process” (Rushin, 2014, p. 3219). Scholars have noted that this selection
process can seem haphazard and based on one specific, well-publicized event of
misconduct (Rushin, 2014; Harmon, 2009). These investigations may be incited by
complaints from a particular civil litigation or private interest group like the NAACP or
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the ACLU, by media reports and attention on a specific department, by research studies
that allude to misconduct within a department, by whistleblowers within the department,
or, in a small number of cases, by one specific complaint or major incident of potential
misconduct (Rushin, 2014). Within my own study, I noted that the investigations were
often launched after public outrage over killings or videos of excessive force. The
investigation of the Ferguson Police Department was launched a month after the death of
the unarmed Michael Brown; the Cleveland investigation was launched after the shooting
of two unarmed black citizens in their car following a high speed chase, with thirteen
officers at the department firing 137 shots at the car (United States Department of Justice,
2014). Seattle’s investigation was launched after public backlash and street protests
against the shooting of a man who failed to comply with orders to put down his carving
knife (Yardley, 2011). These cases have the ability to reach the attention of the Justice
Department because they are publicized by the media and result in public outrage and
protests, but the question remains of whether a department that is not known nationwide
for its tendency to kill or overuse force could potentially be investigated by the
Department of Justice. Thus, the investigations seem reactionary to events that have
already happened in departments that are known for their misconduct, rather than a tool
to prevent misconduct or implement proactive reform. Though individuals who may feel
the department in their city warrants an investigation can file a complaint to the
Department of Justice’s website, the department receives 200 complaints per week,
making it practically impossible to fully investigate every individual complaint fully
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(Kelly, Childress, & Rich, 2015). It seems more likely that these complaints could be
overlooked to focus on the police departments who make national headlines.1
Once the Special Litigation Section is made aware of a particular police
department that may be engaging in unconstitutional patterns or practices, they will begin
a preliminary investigation or inquiry (Harmon, 2009; Rushin, 2014; Simmons, 2011). In
this preliminary inquiry, the investigators use only private complains, news reports,
public data, and occasionally interviews with citizens of the community to gather
information about the police department in question (Rushin, 2014). From this
information, the Department of Justice must decide if the police department engages in a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional behaviors, and if they determine that there is
sufficient evidence to support this claim, a formal investigation is launched (Harmon,
2009; Simmons, 2011).
In the formal investigation, the Department of Justice seeks to confirm a pattern
or practice of unconstitutional behaviors, to determine any institutional causes of
misconduct in the department, and to identify and suggest areas for departmental reform
(Harmon, 2009). These investigations are comprehensive and expensive; they require a
wide-ranging inventory of the policies and procedures implemented by the department
and in-depth interviews with employees (Harmon, 2009; Harmon, 2012). Furthermore,
these investigations tend to be slow-paced and can take a number of years due to the
amount of research that must be done (Rushin, 2014).

1

I can further attest to the difficulty of getting in touch with the Special Litigation
Section of the Department of Justice, the division which handles these cases. I tried for
months to get in contact with a real person at the department, leaving multiple voicemails
and emails. It took a vigorous attempt to finally reach a representative at the department.
10

If a police department is found in violation of the constitutional standards, then
the case could go to trial. However, departments are wary of the expense and
embarrassment of a public trial and are more likely to agree to the terms and reforms set
forth by the Department of Justice (Rushin, 2014). These reforms tend to appear in one of
three ways: a consent decree, a settlement agreement, or a technical assistance letter
(Harmon, 2009). These three methods of enacting reforms are distinct from one another
and vary in their amount of enforceability. In both consent decrees and settlement
agreements, the city agrees to adopt the necessary reforms to avoid a trial but does not
admit liability; consent decrees are issued through a court order, whereas the settlement
agreements are private contracts between the city and the United States (Harmon, 2009).
The Department of Justice provides “independent auditors to monitor and report on the
police department’s compliance with the agreement,” meaning there is a third party
watching the department to ensure it is abiding by the reforms (Harmon, 2009, p. 17).
This independent monitoring agency must also submit publicly accessible records
detailing the police department’s compliance (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division and Office of Justice Programs, 2010). Technical assistance letters are
significantly different in that the departments are not necessarily bound to any specific
reforms. In a technical assistance letter, the Department of Justice issues a findings letter
on departmental defects that could lead to misconduct and suggests remedies for these
problems, but there is no third party put in place to monitor these suggested reforms
(Harmon, 2009). Overall, these reforms are typically consistent and targeted towards
increasing police transparency and accountability (Harmon, 2009).
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Implementation and Limitations of the Statute
In the years after § 14141 was implemented, many scholars held that although it
was still too early to examine the effects of the statute in its fullness, it seemed that the
statute could produce more police accountability depending on its implementation
(Miller, 1998; Livingston, 1999). Although no case had gone to trial by 1998, one scholar
made the case that this statute could serve as “a workable and powerful tool” and argued
its effectiveness would largely “depend upon its implementation by the Department of
Justice” (Miller, 1998, p. 199). He also argued that Congress would need to provide
sufficient funding and resources for the Justice Department in order to investigate the
patterns or practices in the police departments (Miller, 1998). However, Miller voiced
concern that if the reforms presented by the Department of Justice were not thoroughly
implemented and adopted by police departments, § 14141 may only be used to deal with
particularly offensive departments on a case by case basis (Miller, 1998).
Two of the first cases that the nation witnessed in the implementation of § 14141
were those against Pennsylvania’s Pittsburgh Police Department and Ohio’s Steubenville
Police Department. In 1996, the American Civil Liberties Union brought a case forth
against the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, citing civil rights violations such as the use of
excessive force, improper searches and seizures, and the failure to properly supervise and
discipline officers (Clark, 2011). The Department of Justice conducted an investigation of
the police department and entered into a consent decree in which the Pittsburgh Bureau of
Police agreed to certain reforms. A similar investigation was launched in Steubenville,
and the case also resulted in a consent decree to enact reform.
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The consent decrees specified certain reforms for the police departments,
including training in verbal de-escalation tactics, proper investigation of disciplinary
referrals and civilian complaints, and an early warning system to collect and store
information about individual officers (Livingston, 1999). In Pittsburg, this early warning
system had to include:
a textual description of all citizen complaints lodged against him; an account of
any shootings involving the officer; a list of all commendations or disciplinary
actions; a detailed description of all criminal investigations of possible officer
misconduct; and a description of civil or administrative claims filed against the
City of Pittsburgh, the Bureau of Police, or its officers arising from the officer's
activities. (Livingston, 1999, p. 839).
This early warning system could counterbalance the low accountability often involved in
policing and would provide supervisors with a starting point for helping officers change
these practices (Livingston, 1999). Livingston thus argued that § 14141 was beneficial in
mandating certain reforms to aid departments in fairer patterns and practices and could
encourage other police departments to model the reforms made in these consent decrees,
but she remained clear that it was still too early to draw firm conclusions about the
overall effects of the statute and called for scholars to continue studying its effects
(1999).
These initial investigations may have seemed promising in their outcomes, but
throughout the years, scholars have agreed that § 14141 as it is currently enacted is not
sufficient to combat the current amount of police misconduct throughout the United
States (Gilles, 2000; Harmon, 2009; Harmon, 2012; Ross and Parke, 2009; Rushin,
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2014). One of the most apparent issues in enforcing § 14141 is the lack of resources
allotted to the Special Litigation Section for conducting investigations on the
departments. Multiple scholars note the significant shortcomings in the amount of
funding and resources and the impossibility of producing substantial national reform with
these limited resources (Harmon, 2009; Harmon, 2012; Rushin, 2014; Simmons, 2011).
With few attorneys to carry out these investigations and only enough money to
investigate an extremely small percentage of departments per year, the statute does not
have the resources or power to carry out investigations with enough frequency to
incentivize nationwide or department-wide reform (Harmon, 2009).
The lack of resources results in a small number of investigations, meaning a small
percentage of reforms actually being enacted on specific police departments. With its
limited amount of resources, the Department of Justice is only able to conduct
investigations on less than 0.02% of all police departments in the United States per year
(Rushin, 2014). Furthermore, the number of preliminary inquiries that result in formal
investigations is quite small; from January 2000 to September 2013, only 38 formal
investigations were launched from the 325 preliminary inquiries, and in these 13 years,
only 9 cases resulted in a monitored settlement (Rushin, 2014). Because a full
investigation is so costly and resources are so small, it is understandable that there is a
disparity between the number of preliminary inquiries and the number of full
investigations. It is also important to remember that the investigators only have access to
publicly available data and news reports, as well as private complaints; it is
understandable that the Department of Justice might be hesitant to launch such a costly
investigation based on such little information provided in the preliminary inquiry stage.
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There is also a significant disparity between the number of preliminary inquiries and the
number of monitored settlements; only 2.8% of preliminary inquiries result in a
monitored settlement in which the departments is held to the agreed upon reforms
(Rushin, 2014). As Harmon states, this low number of investigations is not enough to
incentivize proactive reforms or efficiently reduce misconduct throughout the United
States (Harmon, 2009; Harmon, 2012).
There is also a significant amount of disparity in the enforcement of § 14141
based on the current presidential administration. Harmon predicted that the Obama
Administration would be more likely to increase resources for this particular law
enforcement issue, and she was correct (Harmon, 2009). The Department of Justice
added nine attorneys to the Special Litigation Section to aid in the enforcement § 14141
during Obama’s administration; Bush, on the other hand, openly stated that he believed
the federal government has no business telling local and state police departments how to
handle operations (Rushin, 2014). Bush also stated that he did not support the Justice
Department’s efforts to conduct oversight or review individual police departments and
did not believe the Justice Department should pursue investigations of these departments
(Simmons, 2011). This is a much different stance than the one taken by Obama’s
administration, under which new investigations have been launched in Ferguson,
Cleveland, and most recently, Chicago in the past three years alone. The outcomes of an
investigation also differ depending on political administrations; under Bush’s
administration, investigations typically resulted in technical assistance letters rather than
consent decrees or settlement agreements, meaning the reforms were suggested rather
than court ordered or agreed upon by a private contract (Simmons, 2011). To further
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illustrate the difference between the Bush and Obama administration’s approaches, it is
important to note that only three of the investigations launched during Bush’s presidency
resulted in a consent decree, while eight of the investigations launched by the Obama
administration have resulted in consent decrees as of 2015 (Weichselbaum, 2015).
Ultimately the resources and the encouragement to enforce § 14141 depends on the
current administration, meaning politics plays a significant role in the statute’s
enforcement (Rushin, 2014). Unfortunately, this leads to an inconsistent enforcement
strategy and limits the potential power of the statute to combat police misconduct.
Despite the Obama administration’s efforts to increase resources and the number
of investigations, scholars conclude that doubling or even tripling the amount of
resources would be insufficient for the purpose of incentivizing police reform and
reducing misconduct nationwide (Harmon, 2009; Harmon, 2012; Rushin, 2014). Even
under an administration that prioritizes and increases funding for these investigations,
Harmon concludes that “without dramatic revisions to the ways in which it is enforced, it
is unlikely that it can be imposed with sufficient frequency to change the calculus of
reform for many police departments engaged in misconduct” (Harmon, 2012, p. 50).
Gilles also suggests that the results of § 14141 implementation have been far from
perfect, stating “this legislation has proven ineffective, as the government has failed to
muster the political will or requisite resources to address systemic police misconduct in a
meaningful way” (Gilles, 2000, p. 1387). Thus, the law is deemed ineffectual by most
scholars as a way to truly incite reform nationwide and reduce the national rate of police
misconduct.
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Suggested Improvements to the Statute
Despite the authority that § 14141 has given the Department of Justice to
investigate local police departments, scholars have continually discussed ways to
improve its implementation (Clark, 2011; Gilles, 2000; Harmon 2009). Scholars such as
Myriam Gilles have argued that § 14141 should be amended to allow private citizens to
bring forth “pattern or practice” suits, since in its original form, the statute has not been
able to bring about a significant change in systemic police misconduct (Gilles, 2000).
Simmons also argues that the lack of stakeholder and citizen participation in bringing
forward an investigation is a setback for § 14141, claiming that the “lack of private action
leaves enforcement of the statute vulnerable to priorities of the political administration in
power” (Simmons, 2011, p. 373). This complaint reiterates a major problem with the
consistent enforcement of § 14141 discussed earlier; its enforcement is greatly influenced
by the will and the priorities of the political administration at the time. Gilles and
Simmons argue that the means of private action should be provided in this suit to increase
the enforceability and effectiveness of the suit.
Gilles also criticizes the way the Department of Justice selected the departments
they had chosen to investigate in the years since § 14141 was implemented. She argued
that they went after “the ‘low-hanging fruit’ that [they] could quickly and easily reform,
while major, urban police departments presented a much greater challenge” (Gilles, 2000,
p. 1408). Gilles also notes that the reforms enacted to these individual departments, such
as the early warning system, would actually benefit police departments throughout the
nation and would thus hold all officers and departments to the same standards of conduct
(Gilles, 2000). Ultimately, it seems as though the creation of a more uniformed method
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for selecting which departments to investigate and department-wide expectations of
conduct could benefit the Department of Justice and would help the effectiveness of the
statute in tackling police misconduct and brutality.
In 2010, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the Office of
Justice Programs held a roundtable in which police chiefs, attorneys, advocates, and other
federal officials discussed the issues concerning § 14141 and discussed ideas for future
improvement of the statute and its implementation (Clark, 2011). A common theme arose
during these discussions: “the need for DOJ to provide a proactive program of education
for law enforcement officials and others involved in local criminal justice systems on
issues related to § 14141 litigation, evidence-based policies and practices, and other
technical assistance to prevent police misconduct” (Clark, 2011). Not only scholars, but
local police chiefs and federal officials have called for a more proactive implementation
of the statute in order to prevent police misconduct and brutality, rather than addressing it
after a major incident occurs in a specific department.
To address the issue of incentivizing misconduct nationwide, Harmon proposed a
“worst-first” policy to determine which departments warrant immediate investigation and
a “safe harbor” policy that would keep departments safe from lawsuits if they voluntarily
implemented certain reforms to ensure best practices (2009). Specifically, Harmon
advocates for the collection of data nationwide to produce police accountability and to
aid in the “worst-first” policy implementation (2009). Harmon raises the issue of
insufficient data, stating:
Any effective effort to reduce systemic police misconduct nationwide requires
data sufficient to estimate where misconduct exists, how departments compare in
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their levels of misconduct, and what the effects are of different departmental
reforms on misconduct over time. No such data currently exist. As a result,
existing § 14141 enforcement is reactive and haphazard rather than proactive and
systematic. (2009, p. 5).
Harmon makes an important assertion, stating that the collection of data nationwide
would aid in proactive reform rather than reactionary investigations. Perhaps by
analyzing comprehensive data and implementing reforms in the most prominent
offenders, the Department of Justice could make larger gains in eliminating police
misconduct and brutality.

Increasing Police Accountability
Many scholars have conducted research and advocated for changes to be made to
§ 14141 in order to increase its effectiveness in proactively addressing police misconduct
and brutality. Some argue, as Gilles did, for private citizens to have a larger role in
bringing forth suits against police departments. Likewise, Simmons advocated for greater
stakeholder collaboration in enacting police department reform policies to ensure better
implementation of the reforms and to create reforms tailored to the specific communities
where they will be enacted (2008). Other scholars argue for a change in the way the
Department of Justice selects which departments to investigate (Harmon, 2009). All of
these arguments aim to improve upon § 14141’s original goal: reducing police
misconduct by increasing accountability and transparency.
The paucity of existing data emphasizes a need for better data collection and
distribution in order to effectively increase transparency and accountability. One article
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detailing police use of deadly force estimates the number of police shooting fatalities in
the United States to be between 300 and 1,000 per year and the collective number of
police shootings, including those that do not result in death, to be between 2,000 and
6,000 per year (Morrison, 2010). The discrepancy between these numbers seems
relatively high, and it would be beneficial to have a detailed account of police shootings
per year. However, as a Washington Post article laments, police involved shootings are
not compiled comprehensively in a database and are instead self-reported by individual
officers at their local departments (Lowery, 2014). The article also notes that it is less
likely for shootings that do not result in fatalities to be reported, resulting in even less
comprehensive data (Lowery, 2014). If accountability is one of the key goals of § 14141,
it appears that comprehensive documentation and data collection of police use of force
would aid the Department of Justice, not only by knowing which departments to launch
an investigation against but also to compare previously investigated department’s
statistics with the rest of the nation’s departments.
Furthermore, it seems that new innovations in accountability techniques would
allow for the collection of nationwide data. In his research, Thomas Schillemans
advocates for accountability through innovative techniques and discusses different
systems police departments use for collecting data to stay accountable. One of these
systems, CompStat, has been used by the New York Police Department since 1994 to
compile reports weekly, monthly, and annually and to identify target areas for crime
(Schillemans, 2013). CitiStat, used by the Baltimore Police Department since 2001, uses
data to evaluate officer performance, including performance objectives and strategies
(Schillemans, 2013). Schillemans also refers to accountability systems developed by
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citizens to aid in transparency in government spending and to twitter accounts employed
by police departments to keep citizens informed of incidents or issues they encounter
day-to-day (Schillemans, 2013). Although systems like CompStat and CitiStat indicate
that technology is available for police departments to record and assess large amounts of
data, a system to collect data on police misconduct and brutality seems to be missing
from these accountability innovations.
Early warning systems, often implemented in departments in a consent decree
after a §14141 investigation, are another key tool in ensuring officer accountability
(Walker, 2012). Not only are they essential for identifying performance problems of
specific officers, but they also have the ability to improve community relations between
citizens and their local police departments (Walker, 2012). As discussed by many
scholars throughout the years, this type of system provides data for departments to
identify and correct systemic problems, benefitting the department as a whole and
providing accountability (Gilles, 2000; Livingston, 1999; Walker, 2012). If this type of
system were enacted in every department, a systemic collection of data would be possible
nationwide and could be instrumental in aiding the national collection of data on police
misconduct and brutality. In fact, early warning systems are highly encouraged by the
Department of Justice, as specified in its “Principles for Promoting Police Integrity”
(2001). These principles specify the need for early warning systems to identify “potential
patterns of at-risk conduct involving the law enforcement agency” by comprehensively
documenting shootings, uses of force, citizen complaints, and many other officer actions
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, p. 10). If every department had this type of system, it
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seems police accountability could dramatically increase and systemic problems would be
much easier to identify.

Chapter 3: Findings Reports
Within this chapter, I identify certain commonalties from the Findings Reports of
the departments in the study. By understanding the types of violations and deficiencies
found in the departments that have been investigated, it is easier to draw conclusions
about the most common types of misconduct and excessive force abuses and who these
abuses most often occur against. As revealed in this chapter, these abuses seem too often
to occur against individuals in a mental health crisis or against members of minority
communities. Furthermore, these Findings Reports offer descriptions of systemic
deficiencies that may cause higher rates of misconduct and excessive force, including
lack of training, failures in supervision, and unclear policies. While the statute may fail to
reach a large number of police departments, the information provided in the Findings
Reports shows the common types of abuses and malpractices that other departments
nationwide might be able to learn from and avoid.

Use of Force Violations
The use of force by police officers is measured in terms of the Fourth
Amendment, which ensures “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” (United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2011, p.1). When an officer uses force that
is excessive or unreasonable during a stop or arrest, this violates the “unreasonable
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searches or seizures” clause (DOJ, 2011, p. 1). Each individual use of force must be
determined reasonable or unreasonable based on the facts and a complete evaluation of
the circumstances; the Department of Justice must consider how severe the crime
committed was, if there was an immediate threat to any person involved in the incident,
and if there was active resistance against the arrest (DOJ, 2011). Thus, after considering
all of the circumstances, the Justice Department can decide if the force was necessary or
excessive (DOJ, 2011). All six of the investigated departments I studied were found in
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the Department of Justice determined a
pattern or practice of unreasonable or excessive force existed in these departments. While
variations existed in the types of use of force violations, I also discovered many
commonalities among the departments in terms of their violations. In all six departments,
the Justice Department found officers used less lethal weapons or impact weapons in a
way that was excessive or unnecessary. Five of the six departments were found to use
excessive or unnecessary force against individuals in a mental health crisis or with mental
health issues generally. Four departments used retaliatory force against individuals who
talked back.
One of the most common themes in the departments investigated was the
excessive or unnecessary use of less lethal force or impact weapons. These weapons
include batons, flashlights, Electronic Control Weapons (ECWs), Oleoresin Capsicum
(OC) Spray, or physical force such as punching or kicking. In the Seattle Police
Department, the Department of Justice brought in consultants to examine half of all the
force reports that included the use of batons and found that 57% of those incidents
involved an excessive use of force (DOJ, 2011). Furthermore, these weapons were
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frequently used by multiple officers against one individual. In one incident described in
the report, a Seattle officer used his ECW twice against one individual, after another
officer had already used his baton 10-12 times on the individual (DOJ, 2011). The
Department of Justice explained in the Seattle Police Department’s Findings Report that
force is harder to justify as reasonable or necessary when multiple officers use force
against a single individual at the same time. In another incident, four officers employed
force against a single, unarmed individual by punching him, striking him with their knees
and fists, and striking him with a flashlight (DOJ, 2011). This incident was exacerbated
by the fact that the individual did not speak English as a first language and was restrained
because he failed to show the officers his hands when they commanded him to do so
(DOJ, 2011). Although the officers justified their force by explaining that the individual
began to kick at the officers as they made contact with him, the Department of Justice
ruled this use of force excessive.
In the Ferguson Police Department, the Justice Department report found that the
use of ECWs was “unconstitutional, abusive, and unsafe” (DOJ, 2015, p. 29). Describing
the use of these weapons as seemingly automatic, the Findings Report lists several
examples of officers using ECWs against individuals in times of noncompliance. When a
woman in handcuffs placed her leg out of the police car door to stop it from closing and
when a handcuffed man refused to get out of the police car upon arrival at the jail, the
officers almost immediately resorted to ECW use, which can be harmful and cause
injuries, against individuals who did not pose an immediate threat (DOJ, 2015).
Similarly, the Findings Report for the Cleveland Division of Police found that officers
used their ECWs immediately rather than using a less forceful option (DOJ, 2014). One
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report revealed that an officer used his ECW on a man twice, despite the fact that he was
already being held to the ground by two other officers (DOJ, 2014). Similar reports of
electronic devices being used multiple times on handcuffed or otherwise restrained
individuals occurred in the New Orleans Police Department and the Puerto Rico Police
Department. As the Department of Justice explains in the Findings Reports, it is
important to first use lower levels of force to control a situation, rather than immediately
employing an electric device that could cause harm and injury to the individual.
In the Portland Police Bureau, ECWs were used on individuals who appeared to
be in a mental health crisis or medical crisis. These incidents are especially alarming
because a person’s mental health must be considered when evaluating if force is
reasonable, according to the Fourth Amendment (DOJ, 2015). These individuals may also
be unable to follow the officer’s demands due to their mental health condition or may be
more likely to act erratically (DOJ, 2011; DOJ, 2015). Because situations involving
mentally ill individuals or individuals in a mental health crisis can escalate quickly, it is
imperative that officers are able to de-escalate these situations rather than resorting to
excessive force (DOJ, 2012). For example, in an incident in August of 2010, three
Portland officers received a complaint when an individual was heard screaming in their
own apartment. The incident was reported by the Department of Justice as follows:

The officers obtained a key from the front desk and entered the apartment after
announcing their entry. They encountered an unarmed, naked man laying on the
floor of his apartment screaming for help. The person leapt up when he saw the
officers and ran towards them. The officer immediately, without warning,
deployed his ECW at the subject’s chest. The subject fell to the ground, but when
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he attempted to get back up, the officer deployed his ECW for three additional
five-second cycles. It turned out the suspect was diabetic and experiencing a
medical emergency. (DOJ, 2012, p. 15)

While the officers may not have been aware of the medical emergency this man was
experiencing, the Justice Department determined that using an ECW on an individual
without warning is a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and excessive because
there was no criminal activity taking place (DOJ, 2012).
Furthermore, the Portland Police Bureau on many occasions failed to
appropriately assess the mental state of the individuals with whom they were interacting,
either because of mental illness or crisis or because of the influence of drugs and alcohol.
Because these individuals may be at a lower capacity to fully understand to an officer’s
commands, the situation may escalate if the officer is not properly trained to deal with
such situations. Portland’s department was not alone in administering excessive or
unnecessary force against individuals with a decreased mental capacity. In Seattle’s
Findings Report, the Department of Justice found that according to the Seattle Police
Department, about 70% of its use of force incidents involved individuals who were
mentally ill or influenced by drugs or alcohol (DOJ, 2011). The Ferguson Police
Department also used ECW devices multiple times and struck their batons on individuals
who were evidently experiencing a mental crisis or who were clearly under the influence
of alcohol or drugs (DOJ, 2015). Similar events occurred in New Orleans, where officers
failed to de-escalate situations involving individuals in a mental health crisis, and in
Cleveland, where ECWs were used against individuals with known mental illnesses
(DOJ, 2011; DOJ, 2014). De-escalation techniques can include verbal de-escalation,
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verbal warnings, and verbal persuasion; slowing the progression of an incident or waiting
a suspect out rather than using direct confrontation; and calling for reinforcement or
special unit assistance (DOJ, 2013; DOJ, 2015). In each of these reports, officers failed to
adequately assess the mental state of the persons with whom they interacted and failed to
de-escalate these situations to avoid the unnecessary use of force against someone who
may not fully understand the officer’s commands.
Officers in multiple departments also failed to de-escalate situations with
individuals who “talked back” and chose to engage in retaliatory force. In the Puerto Rico
Police Department, Ferguson Police Department, and Seattle Police Department officers
attempted to stifle the exercise of free speech, in violation of the First Amendment (DOJ,
2011; 2015). In Ferguson, the Department of Justice found that officers sometimes chose
to arrest an individual depending on their tone or speech. These are classified as
“contempt of cop” cases and “are propelled by [the] officers’ belief that arrest is an
appropriate response to disrespect” (DOJ, 2015, p. 25). Some of these arrests were
conducted with force, despite the fact that the individuals’ actions were protected by their
First Amendment rights. These actions include talking back to an officer with
disrespectful language, recording officer activities, and lawful protesting (DOJ, 2015). In
Seattle, officers employed physical force against individuals who talked back during
arrests, and in one situation, shoved an observer in the chest for heckling and swearing at
the officer (DOJ, 2011). In Puerto Rico, officers used physical force, as well as their
batons and chemical spray, against lawful protestors and bystanders who did not pose a
significant threat (DOJ, 2011). Though officers may feel disrespected by the tone or
speech that individuals use towards them, it is a violation of the First Amendment to
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suppress this free speech, and the Department of Justice requires that officers use deescalation techniques rather than force and unlawful arrests to handle these situations.
Ultimately, the use of force is objective in every case (DOJ, 2011). The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unnecessary and excessive use of force against individuals, and
officers must be adequately trained and prepared to assess a situation in its entirety. That
assessment must include employing de-escalation tactics rather than immediately using
less lethal force or impact weapons, taking into account the mental state of the person
with whom the officer is interacting, and respecting the First Amendment right to free
speech, even if that speech is disrespectful. These abuses of force are not isolated to a
single department; as is evident from the analysis above, commonalities exist across these
six departments.

Systemic Failures
Commonalities also exist in the underlying causes of these use of force violations.
Certain systemic deficiencies within the departments can be found across the board in all
six of the departments researched. Because the Department of Justice found a pattern or
practice of unreasonable or excessive use of force in each of the six departments, it may
seem unusual that the departments themselves did not identify and address this
unconstitutional pattern or practice earlier. However, the Findings Reports of the
departments revealed certain systemic failures that enabled these incidents to continue.
Policy, supervision, and training are important to reduce misconduct and are essential to
good policing; however, the Department of Justice found that each department needed
substantial improvement in these areas. Systemic failure to create clear policies, properly
supervise, and adequately train officers cause misconduct and excessive force because
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officers are left without the proper education and skills to do their job sufficiently.
Unclear policing policies contribute to misconduct by failing to provide a sufficient
guideline for officers. Without proper supervision and investigation into use of force
incidents, officers prone to using excessive force can go undetected and unpunished.
Finally, if training is not thorough and consistent, officers are not prepared to do their job
effectively. Thus these systemic deficiencies enabled misconduct and excessive force to
accumulate at higher rates in these investigated departments and shows the need for
reforms that tackle systemic failures in these areas.
In the Findings Report for the New Orleans Police Department, the Department of
Justice determined that a lack of clear and thorough policy for use of force contributed to
violations (DOJ, 2011). The department’s policies overall were outdated and needed
revision, and they failed to provide critical information to officers, such as how first
responders should handle situations involving a mental health crisis. Because these
policies for use of force failed to provide guidelines for the various types of force an
officer should or should not use, both officers and supervisors were unsure how to
respond to escalating situations, and some believed that using an ECW immediately in
these situations was appropriate. The policies pertaining to ECW use were insufficient in
explaining when and how they should be used and what situations justify their use (DOJ,
2011). The Seattle Police Department had similar deficiencies in terms of policy, as they
failed to create specific, individualized policies for each type of weapon officers were
permitted to use. The Department of Justice explained that policies should state clear
guidelines concerning “the appropriate application of these weapons, including when it is
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appropriate to use the weapon, how often, and the amount of force used per weapon”
(DOJ, 2011, p. 16).
In the Puerto Rico Police Department, the Department of Justice found the same
type of deficiency and criticized the ambiguity of the terms used in the department’s
policies (DOJ, 2011). Similar problems existed in the Cleveland Department of Police,
and officers admitted to the Department of Justice that they were unsure of when certain
levels of force were appropriate. For example, the policy in this department stated that
officers should be on alert and can apply significant force, such as ECW use, when it
appears the individual may attack. However, the signs of an attack mentioned in the
policy include someone stretching their arms during a yawn and looking around to
evaluate the environment (DOJ, 2014). The Department of Justice deemed ECW use too
forceful to use against someone who, by these definitions, may not actually present a
threat to the officer or other individuals. According to the Department of Justice, these
types of policy deficiencies contribute to misconduct and unnecessary force because they
fail to give officers and supervisors a clear and accurate guideline for appropriate force.
Another systemic failure that can lead to excessive use of force is the lack of
adequate supervision and discipline. In the Ferguson Police Department, the Department
of Justice discovered that the failure to adequately respond to and investigate misconduct
complaints led to community distrust of the police, which in turn can make it more
difficult for officers to do their job effectively (DOJ, 2015). This community distrust is
further agitated by the fact that the department “both discourages individuals from
making complaints and discourages City and police staff from accepting them” (DOJ,
2015, p. 82). Complaints at this department generally went without investigation, and
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some individuals were concerned about the consequences of making a complaint because
they feared the officer might retaliate against them (DOJ, 2015). The Puerto Rico Police
Department also employed a method of citizen complaint intake that discouraged citizens
from filing a complaint, according to the Findings Report (DOJ, 2011). Rather than
allowing citizens to file a complaint without direct contact with the department, the
practice at the Puerto Rico department required citizens to give a sworn statement in front
of an administrative investigator (DOJ, 2011). Furthermore, the investigations into these
complaints could take ten years or more to complete, allowing the officer to go without
supervision or discipline in this time frame (DOJ, 2011). In other departments in this
study, like the Portland Police Bureau, supervisors failed to gather significant evidence to
conduct investigations into use of force incidents (DOJ, 2012). The Department of Justice
also determined that the Seattle Police Department failed to adequately collect on-scene
evidence, and their use of force reports omitted vital information necessary to determine
if the use of force was reasonable (DOJ, 2011). Cleveland’s department had deficiencies
in supervisory investigations as well, and the Department of Justice determined that the
goal of this department seemed to be to avoid creating a complete report that could be
reviewed at each level in the chain of command (DOJ, 2014). Even when officers gave
incorrect accounts of their use of force, they were not held accountable, despite the
evidence proving their account was indeed incorrect (DOJ, 2014). Across the board in all
six police departments, the Department of Justice states that investigations into the use of
force are not thorough enough and fail to truly hold officers accountable for use of force
violations.
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Finally, the Findings Reports reveal that insufficient and infrequent training
existed in all six of the police departments in this study. Training is important in order for
officers to become familiar with their department’s expectations on how and when to use
force (DOJ, 2011). Not only should officers be trained before they enter the department,
but training should in fact continue throughout their time working in the department
(DOJ, 2011). This in-service training was missing from the Puerto Rico Police
Department’s program; in 2007, only 11% of the force had received some type of inservice training (DOJ, 2011). Although they improved their in-service training programs
in 2010, requiring a 16-hour minimum of annual training for each officer, the Department
of Justice determined that this minimum was not sufficient enough and failed to train the
officers in protecting the civil rights of citizens (DOJ, 2011). The Department of Justice
also found deficiencies in the New Orleans Police Department’s use of force training,
both in its lack of in-service training to keep officers practicing and refining their skills
and its lack of training for certain types of force. This department’s training focused
mostly on firearms and ECWs but overlooked training on OC spray, batons, and physical
encounters (DOJ, 2011). Furthermore, the New Orleans Police Department failed to
adequately train their officers to handle mental health crises and to interact with mentally
ill individuals, leading to the types of use of force violations discussed earlier in this
chapter (DOJ, 2011). The Portland Police Bureau also lacked officers trained to handle
these types of crises (DOJ, 2012). Without learning the skills to accurately assess and deescalate a situation involving someone experiencing a mental or emotional health crisis,
the officers may escalate the situation and immediately result to unreasonable force
(2011). Seattle’s police department also failed to train their officers in de-escalation
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tactics, according to the Findings Report (DOJ, 2011). The Department of Justice
determined that many of the uses of force in Seattle’s department could have been
avoided if officers had employed verbal de-escalation tactics, which must be learned
through adequate training (2011). As the Findings Report states, “officers are not trained
to fight fair” (DOJ, 2011, p. 23).
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Discrimination and Bias
Because officers are not given clear guidelines in policing policies, are not
adequately supervised by their superiors, and are not trained consistently and thoroughly
in all aspects of their job, they tend to resort to unnecessary use of force levels. The
systemic deficiencies in policy, supervision, and training significantly contribute to the
use of force violations discussed early in this chapter, according to the Findings Reports
issued by the Department of Justice. However, these use of force levels are even more
problematic when they are used disproportionately against certain populations. One of the
major points of contention surrounding the current debate about police brutality is the
concern of police bias or discrimination against certain individuals. While bias and
discrimination may not be a proven problem at every police department in the country, it
does exist in some, according to the Department of Justice. Four of the six departments in
this study engaged in practices that showed evidence of discrimination and that
disproportionately affected certain racial, ethnic, and other communities.
In Seattle’s Findings Report, the Department of Justice did not make a finding
stating that discriminatory policing occurred in this department, but they did state that
“there is a strong perception among segments of Seattle’s diverse communities that SPD
officers engage in discriminatory policing practices against racial and ethnic minorities”
(DOJ, 2011, p. 25). According to the report, 43% of all residents and 53% of black
residents believed this bias existed in terms of racial profiling (DOJ, 2011). Although
they did not make an official finding, the Department of Justice emphasized how
important community perception is for officers to do their job adequately. As in Seattle,
the Puerto Rico Police Department also seemed to engage in discriminatory policing,
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although the Department of Justice withheld from making an official finding. They did
state in the Findings Report, however, that they discovered evidence which suggested
bias and discriminatory practices against individuals of Dominican descent, resulting in
targeted and unjust actions (DOJ, 2011). Officers in this department were accused of
biased profiling and of using racially charged language against Dominican individuals
(DOJ, 2011). The lack of sufficient data and evidence collecting made it harder to draw
concrete conclusions about the existence of discriminatory policing in these departments,
but the Department of Justice uncovered enough evidence to make the topic a point of
concern in the Findings Reports of these two departments.
In Ferguson and New Orleans, the Department of Justice did make an official
finding that determined the existence of bias and discriminatory policing. Ferguson,
perhaps one of the more popular areas discussed in the current debate over police bias
and discrimination, has a black population of 67%. However, this population
accumulated 85% of the department’s traffic stops, 90% of their citations, and 93% of
their arrests from 2012 to 2014 (DOJ, 2015). Other statistical ironies exhibit the
discriminatory nature of the police’s actions in these encounters; for example, black
residents are 26% less likely to be found in possession of contraband during a search but
are 2.07 times more likely to be searched when stopped in their vehicle (DOJ, 2015).
Discriminatory policing is in violation of federal law, including the direct violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (DOJ, 2015). The discriminatory practices of the Ferguson Police
Department were accompanied by direct evidence of racial bias shown in emails sent by
police officers and court supervisors. These emails, directly mocking and stereotyping
African Americans, along with other citizen reports of racial stereotyping, showed that
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racial bias existed within the Ferguson Police Department and went unpunished (DOJ,
2015).
Biased policing was also discovered in the New Orleans Police Department,
allowing the Department of Justice to make a finding of a pattern or practice of
discriminatory policing (DOJ, 2011). This bias was further-reaching compared to
Ferguson in terms of the groups affected, however. According to the Findings Report, the
New Orleans Police Department engaged in discriminatory policing on the basis of race,
ethnicity, and LGBT status (DOJ, 2011). Individuals working in all levels of the
department communicated their own belief that this type of discriminatory practice
indeed occurred (DOJ, 2011). The citizens of these communities feel that they are
targeted; these feelings of distrust and alienation make it harder for police to effectively
do their job and engage with the entire community (DOJ, 2011). Certain minority
communities that have not previously been discussed, such as the Latino and LGBT
communities, were mentioned in the New Orleans Findings Report. The Latino
community in New Orleans expressed hesitancy to report crimes they witnessed or of
which they were victims because they feared being questioned about their immigration
status when the police arrived (DOJ, 2011). The LGBT community also felt targeted and
harassed by law enforcement, citing “a culture within NOPD of insensitivity and
animosity” (DOJ, 2011, p. 37).
Feelings of distrust and discrimination can be further aggravated by a lack of
community policing, according to the Department of Justice. Community policing allows
officers to engage and collaborate with community stakeholders, thus proactively
contemplating and responding to issues within the community where they work (DOJ,
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2011). This type of policing not only helps officers build a relationship with members of
the community, but can also help officers be proactive in preventing crime instead of
simply reacting to it (DOJ, 2011). The police departments in New Orleans, Seattle, and
Ferguson, where evidence suggested bias and discriminatory practice, also lacked
effective community policing techniques. Furthermore, the departments in Cleveland and
Portland also fell short in engaging with their community, even though they were not
suspected of discriminatory practices. The New Orleans department itself publicly
recognized the importance that community policing holds, especially as a tool to help
officers gain respect. However, the department failed to develop partnerships with
stakeholders in their community and engage with diverse community organizations at a
meaningful level (DOJ, 2011). In Ferguson, the Department of Justice stated that the lack
of community engagement increased the tendency of discriminatory practices (DOJ,
2015). By turning away from community policing and focusing only on revenue, the
department no longer worked to build trust and positive relationships with the African
American community. The Justice Department felt this contributed to a sense of
community distrust between African Americans and police officers (DOJ, 2015). Without
any type of community policing or engagement plan, a department becomes disconnected
from its citizens (DOJ, 2015).

Chapter 4: Settlement Agreements
In this chapter, I assess the commonalities of the settlement agreements or consent
decrees that the police departments entered into with the Department of Justice. As stated
in the literature review, these agreements do not mean that the police department admits
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fault or liability but would rather settle on reforms than spend time and money on a suit.
An independent monitor is then put in place to ensure compliance with the agreement.
Noticeably, the Ferguson Police Department is missing from this chapter because their
agreement with the Department of Justice was not fully negotiated at the time of this
study. According to the most recent reports from the Justice Department, the suit has
been resolved, and reforms have been agreed upon. An independent monitor will be put
in place for these reforms (DOJ, 2016).

Use of Force Policy Revisions
As discussed in Chapter 3, the lack of clear policies pertaining to reasonable use
of force created a systemic deficiency that fostered misconduct and excessive force
within the six departments in this study. To mitigate this deficiency, the Department of
Justice outlined specific policy revisions in the Settlement Agreements made with each
city’s department. Generally, these policy revisions include specific guidelines for the
different types of force an officer may use. The purpose of these revisions is to give
officers a clearer idea of how to use reasonable force and avoid escalating the situation
unnecessarily. Some of the agreements require annual training for certain types of force,
such as the use of ECWs, and training in de-escalation techniques.
In all five of the departments that entered into an agreement with the Department
of Justice, the parties agreed to revise the police department’s policies according to the
Department of Justice’s request. The requirements in the Puerto Rico Settlement
Agreement were the least specific and simply required the department to develop their
own specialized policies for the use of lethal force, firearms, canines, ECWs, chemical
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agents, less lethal munitions, batons and other impact weapons, and other force (United
States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Police Department, 2013).
In the policies for general use of force, the Department of Justice required Portland,
Cleveland, Seattle, and New Orleans to use de-escalation and disengagement techniques.
All four of these Settlement Agreements also called for officers to de-escalate force as the
resistance de-escalates (United States v. City of Portland, 2012; United States v. City of
Seattle, 2012; United States v. City of New Orleans, 2013; United States v. City of
Cleveland, 2015). Furthermore, the Cleveland and New Orleans departments were
instructed in the agreements to give individuals time to submit to an arrest before using
force. Certain types of force, such as the neck hold, were prohibited unless the officer had
reasonable cause to use lethal force (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015).
Seattle’s department, which on occasion used excessive force for verbal confrontations,
was required to add a policy eliminating this practice. Similarly, Cleveland was
prohibited for using retaliatory force against individuals. Both New Orleans and Seattle
were instructed to withhold force against handcuffed individuals unless force was
reasonably necessary to prevent harm or injury. These general policy guidelines,
according to the Department of Justice, give officers a clearer understanding of when and
how to use force and reinforce the idea that de-escalating a situation is important in
conflicts with citizens.
The Justice Department also proposed specified policies for specific force
weapons to provide officers with further clarity on the appropriate use of these weapons.
According to Cleveland’s consent decree, ECWs should only be used in situations of
active or aggressive resistance to arrest or detention occurs, or when lower levels of force
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have failed and its use is necessary to prevent physical harm to the individual, the officer,
or an observer (US v. Cleveland, 2015). When an officer plans to use this weapon, he or
she must give a verbal warning and allow the individual an appropriate amount of time to
comply with the warning (US v. Portland, 2012; US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Cleveland,
2015). These policies clarify that officers should only use one round of the electric device
at a time, then must wait a reasonable amount of time before using another round if the
situation warrants further use (US v. Portland, 2012; US v. Seattle, 2012; US v.
Cleveland, 2015). In other words, each round of ECW use counts as an individual use of
force and must be reported as such. The use of an ECW should not be aimed at a person’s
head, neck, or genitalia, should not be used when there is a risk of situational hazards like
falling or drowning unless lethal force is warranted, and generally should not be used on
someone in handcuffs unless a risk of serious physical injury exists (US v. Portland,
2012; US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Cleveland, 2015). Portland’s settlement agreement
further prohibits the use of this weapon against mentally ill individuals, unless under
extreme circumstances (US v. Portland, 2012). Cleveland’s agreed upon policies also
prohibit ECW use on an individual who is fleeing (US v. Cleveland, 2015). Four
settlement agreements required the department’s officers to be trained on these policies
and on general ECW use annually (US v. Portland, 2012; US v. Seattle, 2012; US v.
Puerto Rico, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015).
Other policies provide further clarity on the appropriate use of firearms, OC
spray, and impact weapons. According to the Justice Department, officers should only
draw their firearms if they reasonably believe the situation could escalate to the point that
lethal force will be necessary, and firearms should not be discarded from or at a moving

40

vehicle unless the vehicle is engaging in deadly force (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v.
Cleveland, 2015). Cleveland’s officers are further required to attend 16 hours of firearm
training annually (US v. Cleveland, 2015). The implemented policies for OC spray use
resemble the policies for ECW use; OC spray should only be applied once after a verbal
warning, and officers should wait a reasonable amount of time before using the spray
again if the situation necessitates another use (US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Cleveland,
2015). Officers are also limited in their use of OC spray against individuals in handcuffs
(US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Cleveland, 2015), and Seattle must train their officers on the
physical effects of the spray (US v. Seattle, 2012). Impact weapons are also regulated in
the new policies required by the settlement agreements. The Department of Justice
required Seattle’s department to create a policy explaining that baton use can be lethal,
and officers must be rectified at reasonable intervals to use impact weapons. Cleveland’s
department implemented a policy that prohibits the use of a firearm as an impact weapon,
and another that banned head strikes, except in situations that warrant lethal force (US v.
Cleveland, 2015).

Mental Health and Crisis Intervention
Due to the high levels of force incidents involving individuals experiencing a
mental health crisis, the Department of Justice emphasized the importance of increased
training and understanding in handling these situations. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
interactions between individuals with decreased mental capabilities and police officers
can escalate quickly, partly due to a potentially decreased understanding of the officer’s
demands. The lack of a clear understanding in how to handle these situations and lack of

41

sufficient de-escalation training can also contribute to the use of force violations against
those individuals. In order to increase capability and clarity, the Department of Justice
included certain crisis intervention reforms in many of the Settlement Agreements it
made with the police departments. By increasing crisis training and collecting further use
of force data, the department may feel more equipped to handle crisis situations.
All five agreements outline Crisis Intervention Training (CIT), a program that
allows officers to receive 40 hours of initial and 8 hours of annual training to specialize in
handling crisis situations (US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Portland, 2012; US v. Puerto Rico,
2013; US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015). CIT officers can be at the ready
so if officers encounter a crisis situation, they can have a CIT officer dispatched to help
them. Along with these specialized officers, all officers were also required to take crisis
training, although the hours were less extensive. Cleveland’s officers, for example, were
required to take 8 initial hours of training, and New Orleans’s new officers were required
to take 16 initial hours, and 4 hours per year (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland,
2015). In Portland, this type of training was particularly important because their city had
no community mental health infrastructure to support the mentally ill individuals of the
community at the time of the Settlement Agreement (US v. Portland, 2012). Although
efforts were being made to establish a comprehensive system of mental health support for
the community, the first responders to crisis situations were typically police officers at
that point in time (US v. Portland, 2012).
While training is one crucial aspect of being prepared for mental health crises,
data collection is another tool the Justice Department implemented to track crisis
situations handled by police officers. Officers in Cleveland, for example, were required
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by the Settlement Agreement to track the date, time, and location of the crisis situation
they handled, along with a brief narrative of the event, a description of the subject and
whether or not he or she was armed, the reason for the interaction, what tools or
equipment was used to handle the situation, and if the officer contacted anyone for
assistance (US v. Cleveland, 2015). The expansion of data collection was also called for
in Seattle’s department, along with requirements to employ verbal de-escalation tactics if
encountering a crisis situation (US v. Seattle, 2012). These efforts to improve officer’s
training and ability to handle crisis situations, paired with more comprehensive data
analysis, provides further means of oversight for officers.

Reporting and Accountability
Along with policy reforms, the Department of Justice provided several guidelines
to keep officers accountable, including systematic data collection of use of force
incidents and increased accessibility to civilian complaint forms. These tools increase
transparency of the officer’s actions to supervisors, external monitoring groups, and the
public. Some agreements required the creation of certain outside monitors to assess
officer’s actions and help conduct investigations; Cleveland, for example, was required to
employ a Police Inspector General to review and analyze the department’s policies,
conduct investigations, and make reports to the public (US v. Cleveland, 2015). The goal
of this position, which cannot be filled by anyone who is or was an employee of
Cleveland’s police department, is to increase accountability and transparency in the
department by employing a third party.
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The Department of Justice also aimed to increase accountability and transparency
through the creation of an Early Warning System or Early Intervention System, a tool
which tracks officer use of force and misconduct activity. These systems can create a
threshold for officers who accumulate a higher number of complaints or use of force. The
threshold created in Portland’s Employee Information System, enacted as part of their
settlement, places the threshold for officers who have used force in 20% of their arrests
within a time period of six months and officers who have used force at a rate of three
times or higher the average number of other officers (US v. Portland, 2012). There is
variety among the names of these systems, but they all have the same intended goal. The
departments in Puerto Rico and New Orleans were given specific guidelines to collect the
following in their online data collection systems: all use of force incidents, all injuries
and deaths that occurred in-custody, disciplinary action and non-disciplinary corrective
action for each officer, identifying information for each officer, awards and
accommodations received by each officer, and each officer’s training history (US v. New
Orleans, 2013; US v. Puerto Rico, 2013).
There were also variations in the requirements for these two departments based on
their specific circumstances. For instance, the New Orleans Police Department was
required to include the canine bite ratio, in other words how many times an officer’s
canine bit a civilian, for each canine officer because use of canines had been a problem in
that department (US v. New Orleans, 2013). These programs were designed by the
Department of Justice to collect data that is relevant for all departments, such as an
officer’s use of force incidents and training history, while allowing departments to track
data that is relevant to their own needs. Furthermore, this data collection can be released
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to the public annually, which increases the Justice Department’s ability to improve
officer transparency.
Along with computerized data collection, the Department of Justice set certain
standards in the settlement agreements for the intake and filing of citizen complaints. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the Findings Report in Ferguson revealed that some citizens were
afraid to file a complaint against an officer because they feared retaliation. The settlement
agreements recognize and address this type of fear by explicitly prohibiting this type of
retaliation, or any discouragement or intimidation, of someone who wishes to file a
complaint (US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Portland, 2012; US v. Puerto Rico, 2013; US v.
New Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015). Many of the departments were also required
to make the complaint forms more readily available to citizens. In order to avoid any
intimidation or discouragement that might happen when filing a complaint at the
department, the Cleveland and New Orleans departments were required to disseminate
the forms to various locations around the city, including places like City Hall (US v. New
Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015). Departments were also instructed to make the
forms available online and to allow submission of an email, phone complaint, or written
letter; these forms of reporting could remain anonymous and still would require an
investigation (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015). Some departments
were also required to exclude any language from the civilian compliant forms that might
discourage a citizen from completing it, such as a statement about the consequences of
filing a false complaint (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Cleveland, 2015). These
agreements also set timely deadlines, generally within a year, for the departments on
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conducting an investigation into the compliant to avoid the issue of officers going
undetected and without discipline for many years (US v. New Orleans, 2013).

Bias and Community Policing
Combined with its efforts to increase transparency and accountability, the
Department of Justice also expanded its community outreach initiatives by requiring the
police departments to implement community policing reforms. As discussed in Chapter 3,
the police department can sometimes grow distant from its community, which can lead to
perceptions of biased and discriminatory policing. In the settlement agreements or
consent decrees, the Department of Justice addressed these concerns by implementing
reforms to decrease bias and discrimination within departments and increase
collaboration with diverse and wide-ranging community populations. By developing biasfree policing policies, incorporating training aimed at decreasing this problem, and
creating community councils, the settlement agreements attempt to counteract the
perceptions of bias that they discovered in many departments’ Findings Reports.
In order to reduce biased policing, some departments were required to develop
policies specifically addressing this issue. Seattle’s policy, for example, clarified that
reasonable suspicion or probable cause cannot be perceived on the basis of race,
ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation, or any other type of bias (US v. Seattle, 2012).
The Puerto Rico Police Department’s settlement required the addition of a policy that
directly guides the officer’s interactions with transgender individuals (US v. Puerto Rico,
2013). Furthermore, the settlement agreements for Cleveland, Puerto Rico, New Orleans,
and Seattle each include guidelines for training to prevent biased policing and increase
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sensitivity. Officers typically must be trained by these guidelines annually (US v.
Cleveland, 2015). Many of these guidelines overlap, as they did with the computerized
data collection requirements, but they also allow for variation depending on the
community that the department serves. In Cleveland’s police department, the
requirements for training include:
constitutional and other legal requirements related to equal protection and
unlawful discrimination, including the requirements of this Agreement; strategies,
such as problem-oriented policing, procedural justice, and recognizing implicit
bias, to avoid conduct that may lead to biased policing or the perception of biased
policing; historical and cultural systems that perpetuate racial and ethnic profiling;
identification of racial or ethnic profiling practices, and police practices that have
a disparate impact on certain demographic categories; self-evaluation strategies to
identify racial or ethnic profiling; …the protection of civil rights as a central part
of the police mission and as essential to effective policing (US v. Cleveland,
2015; p. 10-11).
Many of these requirements are included in the other agreements, but other agreements
also have requirements that are not included in Cleveland’s guideline. For example, the
departments in New Orleans and Puerto Rico are also required to train their officers on
the effects of arbitrary stereotypes and classifications, which is not explicitly mentioned
in Cleveland’s guidelines for training (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Puerto Rico,
2013). As with the computerized data collection systems, the goal is the same even if
there is a diversity between specific guidelines for each department.
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Along with implementing policy and training on bias-free policing, the
Department of Justice also set guidelines for community engagement to narrow the gap
between officers and the civilians they serve. The Justice Department states the
importance of community policing and the importance of using the community as a
resource to help create police reforms (US v. Seattle, 2012). Through the agreements, the
Department of Justice seeks to create stronger and more impactful relationships between
the police departments and their communities by creating community councils. Whether
its Seattle’s or Cleveland’s Community Police Commission, Puerto Rico’s Community
Interaction Council, or Portland’s Community Oversight Advisory Board, the Justice
Department creates community-led groups to provide input directly to the department,
make recommendations for reform, and report to the community as a liaison between
officer and civilian (US v. Seattle, 2012; US v. Portland, 2012; US v. Puerto Rico, 2013;
US v. Cleveland, 2015). These panels are intended to be comprised of a diverse
population. Cleveland’s committee, for example includes members of advocacy
organizations, religious groups, youth and student organizations, members of academia,
organizations representing different races, and experts on mental health and homelessness
issues (US v. Cleveland, 2015). Though these organizations typically require a budget,
the Department of Justice deems them necessary to provide communication between
community members and department employees.
To further improve these relations, the agreements often require officers to
receive annual training on community policing tactics. Some departments were instructed
to familiarize their officers with certain areas of the community, including the
demographics, quality of life issues, and community leaders of the area, then to send
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those officers to police that specific area (US v. Cleveland, 2015). This was intended to
create a familiarity between officers and civilians and to increase officer understanding of
the problems, issues, and challenges that face these particular communities (US v.
Cleveland, 2015). The New Orleans and Puerto Rico departments were also instructed to
develop a Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) model to incorporate a
problem-solving method into their policing (US v. New Orleans, 2013; US v. Puerto
Rico, 2013). According to the Justice Department, this model could help create a
collaborative, problem-solving approach to work on solving some of the issues facing the
community where the officers are deployed. Ultimately by increasing collaboration
efforts and decreasing a perception of discriminatory policing, the Justice Department
aims to foster relationships between community stakeholders and leaders and the police
department employees.

A Note on Compliance and Effectiveness
Though these reforms are monitored by independent monitors, the compliance
with reforms and effectiveness of reforms to produce their intended outcomes remains
underwhelming. However, enthusiastic compliance with these reforms, according to news
reports, is generally rare, and departments are more likely to resist and lament reforms
than embrace them. These reforms, as discussed in the chapter, are well-intended and
would certainly seem to be beneficial if they were strongly adhered to by the individual
departments. Unfortunately, these reforms are extremely expensive to the city, costing
perhaps up to $300 million to implement (Kelly et. al., 2015). The expense, along with
other factors, can lead to incomplete compliance by the department. In a follow-up report
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on the Portland Police Bureau, the status showed only “partial compliance” in every
category of the settlement agreement reforms, apart from the Employment Information
System and Community Engagement sections which were given a status of “rating
pending.” This means every level of the settlement agreement needed further attention
and not one category of the agreement reached full, substantial compliance (US v.
Cleveland, 2015). Furthermore, the amount of force used in some departments increased
during and after the proposed agreements, though some did improve (Kelly et. al. 2015).
Thus it is unclear how fully these reforms are able to accomplish their intended goal and
are failing to produce the type of improvement necessary to truly combat excessive force
and misconduct.

Chapter 5: Interviews with Local Departments
In this chapter, I discuss the findings of my local interviews with the Laurel and
Hattiesburg departments. Because these departments are smaller, they provide a different
perspective on the topic at hand. However, they face the same issues that the investigated
departments face, tackling tasks like handling complaints, conducting investigations into
use of force, and dealing with the needs of their community. Though they have some
advantages that departments in the study did not have before reforms, there are many
areas in these local departments that could be improved upon based on the Department of
Justice’s recommendations.

Laurel Police Department
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I interviewed Captain John Cox of the Laurel Police Department to learn more
about the operations of a smaller, local police department. A self-described “old dog,”
Capt. Cox had some reservations about certain popular reforms that the Justice
Department tends to recommend. However, he has embraced the technology that allows
officers to wear body cameras and was more than willing to share his techniques for
handling citizen complaints and use of force incidents. Because the department is small,
they have fewer officers to supply with certain tools. Capt. Cox explained how the
smaller number of officers can allow the department to buy high-technology tools like
body cameras, which can be worn on an officer’s uniform. He believes this accountability
tool allows the department to refute a large number of false citizen complaints of
misconduct. While he did not have any exact data, he estimated that body camera footage
is used for this purpose about 90% of the time. The department committed to pay
$150,000 over five years for this technology, which officers can place on their glasses, in
their shirts, or on their collars. These replaced the faultier TASER cameras as they began
to malfunction after many years of use, and Capt. Cox believes the replacement is
ultimately worth the money. Furthermore, the implementation of body cameras at
Laurel’s department was not reactionary but was simply seen as a chance to utilize better
technology.
Not only can the footage be used to refute claims of misconduct, but Capt. Cox
also believed it may proactively deter some people from filing a false complaint. When a
person wants to file a complaint against an officer from the department, they have to sign
a two-page form swearing to their statement. This means they could be prosecuted for a
false statement should the department find evidence against it and take the claim to court.
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The Laurel department has done this on occasion, but typically Capt. Cox believes these
situations are based on perspective. Some officers who come across as rude may simply
have a dry sense of humor. In other cases, people may be unclear about what actions
constitute misconduct. For example, Capt. Cox relayed a story of an individual who
wanted to file a complaint because they were pulled over by two police cars. This
practice is allowed by Laurel’s policies so officers can have backup; therefore, the
situation did not involve officer misconduct. When asked if the complaint forms were
available online, Capt. Cox explained that they are not, and he prefers it that way because
he feels people are less likely to come in with a false complaint in person. He compares
filing an online complaint to using Facebook; while someone could make an accurate
profile, someone could also easily make a fake profile because the internet takes away the
element of accountability. In person, however, people will fill out the form, but when
they reach the point of having to swear to their statement, they decide not to go through
with it. This is in contention with the Department of Justice’s attitude toward filing
complaints. In nearly every department’s consent decree or settlement agreement, they
were encouraged to make complaints easier to file. The goal was to take away the fear
and intimidation that may occur when filing a complaint at the police department,
whereas the system in place at Laurel makes it a requirement to come to the department
in order to file a complaint.
As far as handling data collection, the department started keeping records of the
complaints a few years ago and stores them along with a letter or memo that states the
complaint has been reviewed and any relevant evidence, such as footage from a
dashboard camera or body camera. The department also reviews every use of force, and
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Capt. Cox explains that he likes to have a good idea of what happened so he can answer
any questions that the Chief or the Mayor may have. Typically, Capt. Cox states there is
nothing to the civilian complaints. Again, he attributes the body camera for dispelling
false complaints against officers, noting however that some officers are offended that
their word is not taken above all else. If there is evidence to corroborate the compliant,
officers could face different levels of discipline. Depending on the level of misconduct,
officers could be given a verbal warning or issued with a written disciplinary action,
which could result in anything from a few days away from work to complete termination.
However, Capt. Cox states that their smaller department does not necessarily have the
type of misconduct issues that larger departments might. For instance, in the time that
Capt. Cox has worked in Laurel, the department has experienced only two shootings,
both of which were thoroughly reviewed and ruled justified.
As for training, the department is willing to spend as much as they can with their
budget to train their officers. However, Capt. Cox does not necessarily believe in deescalation training, explaining that officers should not have to beg to make people
comply. Instead, he prefers the “ATM method,” meaning he will Ask you, he will Tell
you, then ultimately he will Make you. “There has to be an authority figure,” he states.
Instead of de-escalation, he believes that officers are better trained by experience, and
they need to encounter these situations to know how best to handle them over time.
Again, this is much different from the Department of Justice’s attitude towards deescalation training, which they stress is essential to reducing misconduct and excessive
force. Although de-escalation training may not be his preferred method, he did state the
department’s intentions to work with experts in Memphis to develop training for handling

53

mental health crises. He says he has experienced a number of people who do not need to
be in jail, but do need to be in some type of facility. At the time, the city of Laurel does
not have a place for these individuals to go, but Capt. Cox says it is a “work in progress.”

Hattiesburg Police Department
To learn more about operations at the Hattiesburg Police Department, I met with
Lieutenant Jon Traxler who works in Internal Affairs. Although he was not previously
aware of this particular statute, he did some research before our interview. He expressed
that it seemed like a great statute to help eliminate misconduct, despite the fact that there
will always be “a few bad apples” even in law enforcement. Lieut. Traxler also discussed
the Early Warning System used by the Hattiesburg department, as well as their system for
filing complaints.
Much like the Laurel Police Department, Hattiesburg’s department allows citizens
to make a formal complaint by swearing to a two-page form explaining the events. The
form is straightforward; it asks for a name and contact information, a description of the
incident, and a signature. While this type of compliant can be turned in to the municipal
court for a false pretense charge, it is not the only type of reporting an individual can do.
Hattiesburg’s department provides a few more options, including contact through email,
telephone, or written letter to report something that may be misconduct. These types of
reports can remain anonymous, although Lieut. Traxler points out that it will be harder to
update someone on the progress of the investigation if they choose to remain anonymous.
However, these reports are generally still investigated, especially if a car number, date,
time, and location are included in the report. Lieut. Traxler has nothing against
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complaints; as he states, “complaints lead to discipline, and discipline leads to training at
the academy, which can take liability off of the city.” He wants to know if misconduct or
excessive force is occurring so he can do something about it and help the department and
the officer learn from it. The system in place in Hattiesburg is more similar to that
recommended by the Department of Justice, allowing alternative avenues to filing a
complaint in the department.
These complaints, if they are sustained or not sustained, are filed in an online
Early Warning System that tracks each officer at the department. Unfounded or
exonerated claims are not counted in the system, since that means the claim was refuted.
Even if a compliant is not sustained, meaning there is no evidence to support one side
over the other, it is filed in the system. According to Lieut. Traxler, “where there’s
smoke, there’s fire,” and if an officer has accumulated a number of similar complaints,
that needs to be taken into consideration even if the claims were not sustained.
Disciplinary action can result from a sustained claim and can range from a letter of
reprimand, to a general counseling form, to suspension or termination. The Chief decides
the appropriate punishment based on the offense, and the discipline is also filed in the
system. General counseling forms stay in the system for six months and letters of
reprimand stay for one year, but once that time expires, the discipline is no longer
counted against the officer. Suspension, on the other hand, stays in the system
permanently.
As far as the officers’ attitudes towards this system and monitoring devices in
general, Lieut. Traxler says it depends on who you ask. Some officers perceive it solely
as a way for the department to discipline them, but the system also files “attaboys” or
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“attagirls,” praising officers for their good work. If an individual encounters an officer
who was very helpful and wants to commend them on a job well done, this is entered as a
merit into the system. Overall, Lieut. Traxler believes the system works, but he does
recognize that improvements could be made at the level of supervision. He notes that
some supervisors are less likely to take action against their friends, and if a significant
incident arises with an individual who has no record, the Internal Affairs office might be
somewhat blind-sighted. In that type of situation, that typically means the supervisor did
not do their job. Essentially, the Early Warning System will track the data, but the data
has to be entered by the supervisor for the system to be effective.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
The Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute was passed by Congress in 1994 with
the intention of reducing misconduct and excessive force by allowing the Department of
Justice to take a direct role in investigating and reforming individual police departments.
However, the statute has failed to produce the type of reform that could truly reduce
misconduct at a nationwide level. Not only is the ability of the department extremely
limited in carrying out a large number of investigations, but the investigations might not
even lead to significant, meaningful change in the department. There are a number of
problems facing the statute that have been discussed in this thesis.
The first is the inability for the Department of Justice to reach a large number of
police departments throughout the nation. Due to lack of resources, the Justice
Department can only investigate an extremely small number of departments. Thus, the
statute is almost implemented in such a way that a well-publicized, often brutal event
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must occur before a department is considered for an investigation. Though there are ways
to file complaints individually with the Department of Justice, this research shows it is
unlikely they will open an investigation on a department without a substantial amount of
publicity and public outrage. This causes the Department of Justice to act in a reactionary
way to the departments that are featured in the news because of the horrific killings of
unarmed individuals. Essentially, the Department of Justice comes in to clean up a mess
that, by the time it is finally addressed, has already affected the community in a
devastating and seemingly irreversible way. Chapter 3 highlights the type of excessive
force that has been occurring in each department before the Department of Justice makes
its arrival on the scene. By the time they come in to investigate, officers are already
accustomed to using heightened levels of force, almost as a second nature. When a person
does not comply immediately, officers pull out their batons or ECWs. Furthermore, the
relationship between the community and the police is already severely damaged by the
time the Justice Department investigates and reforms a department. The deep-seated
distrust that minority communities feel towards the department may be hard to mend in
the course of an investigation. Ultimately, this statute leaves no way for the Justice
Department to proactively produce the type of reform that could save lives.
The second major weakness of the statute is the evidence to show it can enact
reforms that will actually be adhered to and result in improvements. Although this
particular weakness warrants further research, reports show that the reforms may not be
wholly implemented in the departments and that they might not produce their intended
goals. If the Department of Justice is to truly reduce the type of excessive force that it
tries to tackle, it must be sure that the reforms are being embraced by the police
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departments and implemented to their full extent. Further, it must be sure that the reforms
will actually work, especially when they are so costly for the city and the taxpayers.
Unfortunately, there is not overwhelming evidence that these reforms are working in the
departments. This could be due to factors beyond the Department of Justice’s control,
such as the individual attitudes of officers; however, if these reforms are not working as
they are intended to, the Department of Justice needs to regroup and devise a better
strategy for preventing misconduct.
These weaknesses prevent the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute from
effectively preventing reform nationwide, but there are still lessons that can be learned
from the investigations of the six departments in this study. First, the analysis of the types
of force and systemic deficiencies could be reviewed by police departments to identify
where they could improve in their own department. For example, departments that do not
enforce de-escalation training might look at Chapter 3 and reconsider their stance. When
officers are quick to pull an ECW or a baton, rather than using de-escalation techniques
to handle the situation, excessive force can occur. Local departments should take note of
this and revise their training policies to include these important skills to ensure a low
level of misconduct. Second, the recommendations for community policing should be
embraced by departments around the nation to prevent the type of racial tension shown in
the Ferguson and New Orleans. Rather than allowing division to increase between
minority communities and the police department, departments should be actively seeking
out community stakeholders and engaging in discussions with them to tackle the specific
problems of the local community. Finally, departments need to increase the ability for
individuals to bring forward complaints without being intimidated or discouraged from
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doing so. This can be done relatively easily by making forms available online or in
establishments around the community. If the problems in any department are really going
to be fixed in a meaningful way, the department must know where to start. By allowing
individuals to bring forward citizen complaints easily and without intimidation,
departments can see where their weaknesses are so they can make improvements. These
suggestions are simply suggestions. They cannot be forced upon every single police
department through a “pattern and practice” investigation launched under this statute.
However, they are the type of proactive reforms that could potentially limit excessive
force and possibly prevent the taking of another life.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Interview Questions
1. What previous knowledge, if any, do you have about Law Enforcement
Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. § 14141?
a. If you have knowledge about the statute, do you feel it is an
effective tool for limiting police misconduct and increasing
accountability?
2. What system is currently in place for collecting and investigating civilian
complaints against individual officers?
3. Is there any type of early warning system or data collection system in place to
assess individual officer performance?
4. Is there any type of data collection system in place to assess overall
department performance?
5. Do you identify any flaws in these systems in their ability to keep police
officers accountable and limit misconduct?
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